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ABSTRACT
KELKAR, SOHAM, P. MSCS, Department of Computer Science, Wright State University, 2017.
DETECTING INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN ANDROID MALWARE USING STATIC TAINT
ANALYSIS.

According to Google, Android now runs on 1.4 billion devices. The growing popularity has attracted attackers to use Android as a platform to conduct malicious activities.
To achieve these malicious activities some attacker choose to develop malicious Apps to
steal information from the Android users. As the modern day smartphones process, a lot of
sensitive information, information security, and privacy becoming a potential target for the
attacker. The malicious Apps steal information from the infected phone and send this information to the attacker-controlled URLs using various Android sink functions. Therefore, it
necessary to protect data as it can prove detrimental if sensitive data of the user gets leaked
to the attacker. In this thesis research, we first discuss our static taint analysis framework
used to track sensitive information flow from source to sink. We then study the relationship
between the leaked data and URLs involved in the information leakage. The framework
was tested on more than 2000 malicious samples to determine whether the samples leak
information and the external URLs participating in the information leakage. The result
shows that 30 percent of malware samples leak 24 unique Android sensitive information to
around 330 suspicious URLs. We try to derive relations between the leaked data and the
suspicious URLs to gain more intelligence on information security and privacy threat from
information leaking malware samples. Finally, we conclude our research by discussing
some various information leakage scenarios other than suspicious URLs. Our study raises
awareness in both network security and information security domains where programmers
fail to follow secure coding practices.
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Introduction
In this thesis, we propose a solution that can analyze the Android source code for
information leakage detections. We first discuss static taint analysis framework to detect
information leakage and then try to correlate the leaked data with different sinks. We also
demonstrate the use of Single Static Assignment and the Environment Structure mechanism
in our taint analysis framework and how it makes smooth and efficient tracking information
flow in an object-oriented code.

1.1

Motivation
The advancing technology in mobility has attracted millions of smartphone users. An-

droid is a Linux-based operating system developed by Google that nearly runs over 1.4
billion devices [1]. According to Statista’s comparison for leading app stores [2], there are
around 2.8 Million apps on Google Play store. The number indeed indicates that there is a
huge demand for Android applications in the smart-phone market.Apart from Google play
store there also third-party app stores and forums which distribute free Android applications. Most of these app stores do not have strict security checking on the uploaded App.
Lack of security checks makes it possible for attackers to upload their malicious apps on
the market and infect a large number of users. The modern smartphone is as capable as
our laptops to perform a task. We can do all types of tasks such as email, listen to music,
browse the internet and internet banking that we used to do on our personal computers or
laptops. The sensitive data processed by the phone and applications running on the phone
1

are thus becoming vulnerable to the attacker. An attacker who wants to collect sensitive
information from the target can develop malicious apps or modify the existing benign apps
to harvest the data. These Apps then communicate with the attacker to send sensitive information from the infected device which poses a significant information security and privacy
risk to the device owner. Therefore it is necessary to develop a framework which can analyze the malicious Apps to determine whether App leaks any sensitive information to the
attacker. The more we can collect data from the malicious App, the more we can provide
security measures to safeguard the sensitive data of the Android user.

1.2

Background
To develop a security framework which can analyze malicious binaries and detect in-

formation leakage we need to understand different methodologies. Below are some of the
background information on various information security aspects and analysis methodologies

1.2.1

Information Leakage and its impact on the security

We can categorize information into sensitive and non-sensitive depending upon the
context of the application. The latest smartphones are capable of carrying sensitive information associated with the smartphone users. Location coordinates obtained from GPS
receiver can be used to mark the location of the user on the map. DeviceID can be used to
identify a smartphone user uniquely. Network information related to Wireless network can
tell wireless security of the access points. Most of the new Android smartphones come with
an extensive range of built-in sensors. These sensors carry information which is personal to
the user. In addition to data collected from hardware sensors, data stored in phones internal
storage or external storage such as contacts, messages, phone logs, sim card information,
camera photos can also reveal much information related to the user. If the sensitive infor-

2

mation of the user gets leaked, then the user is exposed to additional risks associated with
the criticality of data, e.g., GPS coordinate can be used by an attacker to track user location.
In one of the articles[3] terrorist groups spied on army location based on the information
leaked by the malware. Wifi related information can be used by the attacker to determine
the wireless security of the Android users operating environment. An attacker can use
malware to leak sensitive information of the Android smartphone users to the malicious
domain or logs.

1.2.2

Static Analysis

To analyze an Application for finding malicious behavior, we need to understand what
are the instructions that are executed by the application. To follow these instructions we can
reverse engineer the Application to suitable intermediate representation. The intermediate
representation can be assembly level language or source code itself. Now that we have the
intermediate representation or the source code of the application we can start analyzing
the application by determining malicious instructions or applying machine intelligence to
detect malicious intent of the App. As we do not have to run the application, we term
this analysis as static analysis. The major advantage of performing the static analysis is
that we are directly applying intelligence on the malicious code rather than just identifying
malicious behavior. Moreover, many malware detects if the App is running in the virtual
environment and changes their malicious activity which makes it difficult to analyze them.
In the next section, we discuss Dynamic analysis methodology and its advantages and
disadvantages.

1.2.3

Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic methods use the execution of methods to analyze the behavior of the software. The software can be analyzed dynamically by running it on a virtual machine and
then observing the data generated using packet capturing tools. The main advantage of
3

using dynamic analysis over software is tracking runtime behavior of the app which is not
possible in static analysis. The figure shows the network traffic captured by Wireshark of
one malware sample. The data leaked is in plain text so we can see what type of data is
leaked by the sample.

Figure 1.1: Information leakage capture by Wireshark

1.2.4

Why Static over Dynamic for taint tracking?

Capturing encrypted network traffic generated by the samples are hard to analyze for
information leakage. Malware can encrypt the data before it leaks information to a malicious domain which makes dynamic analyzers challenging to detect information leakage.
However, a static analyzer can use taint tracking to determine information flow from source
to sink. In our research, we developed a taint analysis framework which leverages the benefits of static code analysis for detecting information leakage in Android malware samples.

4

1.2.5

Taint Analysis

Taint analysis is an information flow analysis technique to analyze data carried by
different variables and objects in the program. When an instruction executes, the data
associated with the variable is modified. By tracking the information flow, taint analysis
can be used to detect data flow of sensitive information from source to sink. In our research
context, we term sensitive information as a taint. We use code analysis technique to track
the propagation of taint to determine the malicious behavior of the software. The following
pseudo code 1.1 illustrates how taint tracking works.

Listing 1.1: Simple Pseudocode For Taint Tracking
1
2
3

var a = getSensitiveInfoFromPhone();
var b = a ;
var z = b +1;

Line 1 of the code use getSensitiveInfoFromPhone() to get sensitive information from
the phone. We term sensitive information as taint, therefore the var a which stores taint
information is now mark as tainted. To keep tracking the propagation, we can maintain
table containing variables and their taint status in the memory. Line 2 assigns the value of
a to variable b. The operation transfers taint value of a to variable b. The above operations
is a simple representation of taint tracking. In our research, we developed taint analysis
framework to handle complex data assignment operations. We now proceed to our next
chapter which discusses our implementation of taint analysis framework.

1.2.6

Goal

In this thesis, we developed a taint analysis framework which runs analysis on Shimple
an SSA representation of the Android source code. The framework should handle as much
as possible the single static representation of the code and provide an accurate tracking
mechanism for information flow within different variables. As the Android programming

5

is based on Java, the framework has to handle both APIs from Android and Java to support
taint analysis over object-oriented language. There are a lot of input and output vectors for
the information flow in object-oriented code. We focus on developing on framework capable of covering as much as information flow vectors by reducing false negatives and false
positive results. The system is designed to track data to suspicious URLs. The framework
should be capable of reliably detecting suspicious URLs and other sinks in information
leakage. We relate the information to the suspicious domains after the taint analysis. We
try to cover as much as possible the relation of leaked data to different sinks.

1.2.7

Organization

We have divided the thesis into different chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the background
information on security impacts of information leakage, taint analysis and methodology
used in the project. We review and discuss the related research studies in Android malware
taint analysis by various security researchers in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the design
and challenges of our framework. We then discuss the implementation of the framework
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the results found and provide in-depth details of the
correlation of leaked data with different sinks. Finally, we discuss the limitations of our
framework, and possible future work needed to solve the shortcomings in Chapter 6.

6

Related Work
There are numerous studies which concentrate on taint analysis of Android applications. Most of them are based on static and dynamic taint analysis to detect information
leakage. Steven [4]created Flowdroid a static taint analysis tool for Android applications.
The Flowdroid uses Android lifecycle and context flow analysis to achieve taint analysis.
Android applications have multiple entry points. The Android application uses four different types of components, activities for user actions, services for background tasks, content
providers for storage and broadcast receivers for global events. These all components are
registered in the AndroidManifest.xml file. The Flowdroid uses all these components to
construct lifecycle of the application. Using the layout, the Flowdroid generates a dummy
Main method and build a call graph as an input to the taint analysis engine.Flowdroid provides a good taint tracking mechanism from control flow graph, but it lacks taint tracking
mechanism for variables declared as public static. These variables can be accessed from
any part of the program, and so they can be used in taint propagation. Moreover, Flowdroid
only discusses taint analysis and does not cover the sinks used in the information leakage
such as URLs.
William [5] combined Flowdroid and Epicc analyzers to precisely track both intercomponent and intracomponent data flow. They broke down the analysis into two phases.
The first phase determines flows enabled by applications and the possible conditions for
these data flows. The second phase takes the first phase as an input to enumerate more
dangerous data flows by considering the application as a whole.This model also fails in
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covering variables declared public static. So there is a high chance of false negative rate in
the system.
Leakminer developed by ZheMin Yang [6] detects information leakage through static
taint analysis. The Authors use the pre-processing methodology of the application to transform the DEX bytecode and loading of the metadata. The preprocessing involves converting DEX bytecode to Java bytecode and extracting app-rquired permissions from the
metadata. The authors use these selected permissions to eliminate unuseful API calls to
identify the legitimate method calls to the sensitive data. Using the transformed DEX code,
they build a call graph detailing activity lifecycle callbacks and service callbacks. Now
both sensitive data identified through permissions and call graph are given to taint analysis
engine to detect information leakage.
Dflow and Dinfer are context-sensitive information type inference system developed
by Wei Huang [7] to detect information leakage. The authors proposed context flow system
and type inference system for taint analysis. The system first associate type qualifiers with
the variables depending upon the taint status. The inference engine use typing rules set
based solution and valid typing approach to detect if there are type errors. If there is no
type error, then there is no flow from source to sink else it signals potential privacy leaks.
Anshul Arora [8] propose detection of Android malware by analyzing network traffic
generated by the malware. The authors built a rule-based classifier for detecting Android
malware. The authors used an emulator to run malicious binaries and create network traffic.
The network traffic is then captured using TCP dump. The authors propose traffic features
and rule-based classifier to identify malicious network traffic. The authors also discuss
different risk levels depending on the characteristics matched.
Some research studies such as ScanDal by Jinyung Kim [9] discuss detection of privacy leaks in Android applications. The ScanDal uses path-insensitive, context-sensitive
with a context depth and flow sensitive and flow insensitive hybrid analysis. The authors
propose the semantics for Dalvik core an intermediate representation of the Dalvik byte-
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code. Using the schematics and abstract syntax rules the ScanDal detects information leakage.
Xuetao Wei [10] developed Aura a system which can detect URLs an Android App
communicates. The system uses both static and dynamic analysis to find URLs which App
communicates. The static analysis component determines embedded URLs within the app
bytecode. The dynamic analysis component detects URLs by capturing network traffic
using tcpdump. The authors then categorize the URLs based on the malicious reputation
of the URLs using VirusTotal.Although Aura can be used to detect URLs contacted by
the malware sample, Aura does not implement information tracking mechanism for these
URLs.
There are many research studies[11][12][13][14] which only focuses on Android permissions to detect malicious nature of the Android binary. Android permissions are the
security feature provided by the Android to grant sensitive resource access to the application. If an App wants to access GPS location, then the App requires Location service
permission to access GPS coordinates from the GPS receiver. Thus denying access to the
sensitive resource through permissions can stop malware accessing sensitive information.
Although these can be a useful starting point to identify malicious nature, many users tend
to give permissions neglecting the security features provided by the Android operating system.
Although most of the studies focus on information leakage, none of them focus on
the sensitive information leaked by the malware to the attacker-controlled URLs. From the
information security perspective, it is necessary to detect both the leaked information and
the malicious actor in the attack. Therefore in our research, we not only focus on the static
taint analysis of information leakage but also focus on the information leaked to various
malicious URLs and deriving the relationship between them.
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Design
In this chapter, we describe the design of our Taint Analysis Framework. Our framework is made up of two modules. The first module is a reverse engineering component
which converts android binary to intermediate representation and the second module perform static analysis on the decompiled files using the Parser. Figure 3.1 shows the architectural diagram of our taint analysis framework.

Figure 3.1: Simple Framework
The taint analysis framework is made up of following main components: 1) APK
(Android Package File) 2) DEXPLER (Reverse Engineering tool) 3) SSA (Intermediate
Representation) 4) Source Functions (Android sensitive source methods) 5) Sink Functions (Android functions responsible for leaking data) 6) Rules (Generic rules to handle
10

assignment operations of system defined functions) 7) Parser (Source code analysis tool)
8) Data leakage (Results)

3.1

APK (Android Package)
Android use APK (Application Package) format to install apps on the Android operat-

ing system. The Android Application Package (APK) is an archive which is a resultant of
compilation of Android source code. Android programs are basically developed using Java
programming language. To run the application, Android use the DEX file inside the APK
which contains classes and methods necessary to execute the instructions. Apart from DEX
file APK contains Androidmanifest.xml to contain additional information such as App information and access permission. To analyze the source code of the Android malware we
pass the APK of the sample through reverse engineering tool to get intermediate representation of the source code. We now discuss the reverse engineering tool in our framework to
decompile the Android Application Package into intermediate representation (IR).

3.2

DEXPLER
Although Android applications are developed in Java programming language they do

not run on Java Bytecode but instead use Dalvik bytecode. The Java code is compiled to
Java bytecode and then transformed to Dalvik bytecode using dx tool. To analyze Dalvik
bytecode for static analysis, it first need to be converted into an intermediate form suitable for code analysis. Dexpler[15] a software package converts Dalvik bytecode to Jimple
(IR). The Dexpler is built upon Dedexer (disassembler tool for DEX files) and Soot (framework for analyzing and transforming java and Android applications). Soot[16]converts Java
bytecode to soots internal representation. The internal representation used in DEXPLER
is Jimple which is three address intermediate representation suitable for optimization. In
our research, we modified the DEXPLER to convert Dalvik Bytecode to Shimple (Single
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static assignment version of Jimple). The next section describes Shimple (Single static
assignment) and its usage in taint analysis.

3.3

SSA (Single static assignment) as Intermediate Representation
Single static assignment is a property of intermediate representation (IR) where each

variable is defined exactly once. The uniqueness of variable names helps in taint tracking
because the source code analyzers has to track information of variables on individual basis.
We now discuss essential characteristics of single static assignment representation and how
they can be used in taint analysis.

Listing 3.1: Single Static Assignment Variable Declaration
1
2
3
4
5
6

android.telephony.TelephonyManager $r8;
java.lang.String $r9, $r12, $r15, $r19, $r9_1, $r15_1, $r15_2;
char $c2, $c2_1, $c2_2;
android.location.LocationManager $r10;
android.location.Location $r11;
double $d0, $d0_1;

The above listing 3.1is a sample abstract of the single static form of the declared variables in the Android source code. From Figure 5 we can observe variables used by different
Class objects. Lets discuss variables used by java.lang.String class. The java.lang.String
class uses seven different variables having initial letter $. These variables are assigned
value exactly once in the function where they are defined. For example, if $r9 is assigned
some value in Function X, then the value of $r9 remains constant and is not changed till
Function X cycle is complete. For taint analysis purpose this is an important characteristic
as we just need only to track data contained in the variables.

Listing 3.2: SSA Variable assignment
12

1

2

3

4

5

$r11 = virtualinvoke $r10.<android.location.LocationManager: ...
android.location.Location ...
getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String)>("gps");
$d0 = virtualinvoke $r11.<android.location.Location: double ...
getLatitude()>();
$r9_1 = staticinvoke <java.lang.Double: java.lang.String ...
toString(double)>($d0);
$d0_1 = virtualinvoke $r11.<android.location.Location: double ...
getLongitude()>();
$r12 = staticinvoke <java.lang.Double: java.lang.String ...
toString(double)>($d0_1);

Listing 3.2 shows the data assignment operation using SSA representation. We can
observe that each assignment process use a separate variable for storing information. Thus,
for taint tracking, this makes it easy as we do not have to consider external events which
alter the information contained in the variable. [More]

3.4

Source Functions
Android Platform comes with different inbuilt APIs with their classes and methods. To

access resources on Android phone, a call to system method is required. We researched on
various system method calls which collect sensitive information from the phone and termed
those system methods as sources. To give an example of source functions, getDeviceId()
method can be used to get IMEI number of the device while getLastKnownLocaion() can
collect GPS coordinates of the device.Listing 3.3 shows source function assignment operation.
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Listing 3.3: Example of SSA represenation of Android source function
1

2

3

$r9 = virtualinvoke $r8.<android.telephony.TelephonyManager: ...
java.lang.String getDeviceId()>();
$r11 = virtualinvoke $r10.<android.location.LocationManager: ...
android.location.Location ...
getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String)>("gps");
$r14 = staticinvoke <android.os.Environment: java.io.File ...
getExternalStorageDirectory()>();

We created a database of source methods to pass it to the parser so that parser can use
those methods to search it in the decompiled code. The source APIs and their classes are
taken from official Android Developers website[17]as show in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and
Table 3.3
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Table 3.1: Source Functions
SOURCE FUNCTION

RETURN TYPE

INFORMATION CARRIED

getAllCellInfo

List

Information

getCellLocation

CellLocation

Cell tower information

getDeviceId

String

DeviceId

getDeviceSoftwareVersion String

Software Version

getLine1Number

String

Sim1 number

getNetworkOperator

String

Network operator data

getNetworkOperatorName

String

Network operator name

getVoiceMailNumber

String

Voice Mail Number

getAllProviders

List

Network provider list

getLastKnownLocation

Location

GPS cordinates

getAltitude

double

GPS altitude

getLatitude

double

GPS latitude

getLongitude

double

GPS longitude

getSpeed

float

Device speed

getAccounts

Account[]

Account information

getAccountsByType

Account[]

Account information by type

getAuthToken

AccountManagerFuture Authentication token

getPassword

String

Password

getPreviousName

String

Last user name information

getUserData

String

User Data

getAppTasks

List

Application Task Information

getDeviceConfiguration

ConfigurationInfo

Device configuration

getMemoryInfo

void

Memory information

getProcessInErrorState

List

Error process information

getRunningAppProcesses

List

Running process information

getRunningServices

List

Running services

getRunningTasks

List

Running taks
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Table 3.2: Source Functions
SOURCE FUNCTION

RETURN TYPE

INFORMATION CARRIED

query

Cursor

Database table information

getPackageName

String

Package name

getActiveAdmins

List

Admin information

getApplicationRestrictions

Bundle

Application restriction info

getCurrentFailedPasswordAttempt int

Failed password attempts

getDeviceOwnerLockScreenInfo

CharSequence

Lock screen info

getPasswordExpiration

long

Password expiration

getPasswordHistoryLength

int

Password length

getPasswordMaximumLength

int

Password maximum length

getPasswordMinimumLength

int

Password minimum length

getSystemUpdatePolicy

SystemUpdatePolicy Update Policy Information

getUserRestrictions

Bundle

User restriction info

getWifiMacAddress

String

Wifi Mac Address

getConnectedDevices

List

Connected Devices

getAddress

String

Device Address

getName

String

Device Name

getRemoteDevice

BluetoothDevice

Remote Device Name

getDescription

ClipDescription

Clipboard info

getItemAt

ClipData.Item

Clipboard item

getColumnIndex

String

Database column information

getColumnName

String

Database table information

getColumnNames

String[]

Database table information

getAttachedDbs

List

Databases attached info

getPath

String

File path

getVersion

int

Version Info

acquireDrmInfo

DrmInfo

DRM info

getMetadata

ContentValues

Meta-data Information

getSensorList

List

Sensor List
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Table 3.3: Source Functions

3.4.1

getCipher

Cipher

Cipher info

getSignature

Signature

Signature Information

getActiveNetworkInfo

NetworkInfo

Network Information

getAllNetworkInfo

NetworkINfo[]

List Networks Information

getAllNetorks

Network[]

List of all Networks

getDefaultProxy

ProxyInfo

Default Proxy Information

getDetailedState

NetworkInfo.DetailedState Phone state info

getHost

String

Host Address

getPort

int

Port Number

getKey

SecretKey

Key

getCertificate

SslCertificate

SSL Certificate Information

getBSSID

String

Wifi BSSID Information

getIpAddress

int

IP address

getMacAddress

String

MAC address

getSSID

String

Wifi SSID Information

getConnectionInfo

WifiInfo

Wifi Connection Information

getScanResults

List

Wifi Scan Result Information

getInetAddresses

String[]

Network Inet Information

getHostAddress

String[]

Network Host Address

getSimOperator

String[]

Sim card provider

getSimOperatorName() String[]

Sim card operator name

getSimSerialNumber()

String[]

Sim card serial number

getSubscriberId

String[]

Sim card Subscriber Info

getVoiceMailNumber

String[]

Voice Mail Number

Design Challenge

There are a lot of input vectors that can act as SOURCE for sensitive information. We
try to cover as much as possible the SOURCE function from both Android and Java class
methods. Many Android Apps store information into a local database including contacts
and other details which can be queried by an App if it has appropriate permissions. The
database tables of different Apps also act as SOURCE for our framework. The major
challenge is the data represented in tables is unknow and varies from App to App. As
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there is no particular SOURCE function for representing data in tables we consider any
operation to the local database as sensitive information extraction from the smartphone.
Many Classes have same method names, so we have only studied those methods which can
act as SOURCE in information leakage.

3.5

SINK FUNCTIONS
Like source functions, Android Platforms comes with APIs which can be used to trans-

fer data to external network or outside application memory space. A malware can use one
of these system APIs to leak sensitive information to the outside world. We researched on
various system method calls which outputs information outside application memory space
and termed those system methods as sinks (e.g. put() method of org.json.JSONObject class
can be used to store sensitive information in the form of Json object and leak information
to the URL.Listing 3.4 shows an example of sink functions.

Listing 3.4: Example of SSA represenation of Android source function
1

2

3

virtualinvoke $r1_1.<android.content.Intent: ...
android.content.Intent ...
putExtra(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("pkgname", $r2_3);
staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int ...
d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>($r3, $r2_2);
virtualinvoke $r1.<org.json.JSONObject: org.json.JSONObject ...
put(java.lang.String,java.lang.Object)>("id", $r3);

We created a database of sink methods to pass it to the parser so that parser can use
those methods to search it in the decompiled code for possible leaks. The sink APIs and
their classes are taken from official Android Developers website as shown in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Sink Functions
SINK FUNCTION CLASS

SINK FUNCTION

android.media.ExifInterface

setAttribute

org.json.JSONObject

put

org.json.JSONObject

accumulate

org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpPost

execute

java.util.Map

put

org.apache.http.message.BasicNameValuePair >

3.5.1

java.io.OutputStream

write

android.graphics.Canvas

drawText

android.graphics.Bitmap

setPixel

android.os.Bundle

putBinder

android.util.Log

int d

java.io.OutputStreamWriter

append

android.content.Intent

putExtra

android.telephony.SmsManager

sendTextMessage

android.content.Context

sendBroadcast

android.media.MediaRecorder

start

Design Challenge

There are a lot of output vectors that can act as SINK for sensitive information. We try
to cover as much as possible the SINK function from both Android and Java class methods.
We only cover the most popular SINK functions that are commonly used in Android and
Java programming to transfer through different App functionality.

3.6

Rules
Other than source functions and sink functions Android Platform comes with inbuilt

classes and methods that can have influence on taint propagation. As Android programs are
developed using Java Programming language, Java class methods can also have influence
on taint propagation.For taint tracking, we need to track various operations which affect
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taint propagation. Table 3.5 gives a list of operation which can influence taint propagation.
The taint status of the destination variable depends upon the taint status of the calling object
as well as the return value of the function call.
Table 3.5: Rule Categories
NO
1
2
3
4
5

OPERATION
x= y
X = y1.functionP()
x = y1.functionP(a)
x = y1.functionQ()
x = y1.functionQ(a)

COMMENT
Simple data assignment operation.(e.g. if y is tainted then x is tainted)
Operation containing function calls tosystem methods with no parameters.(e.g. if y1 is tainted then x is tainted)
Operation containing function calls tosystem defined methods with parameters.(e.g. if a is tainted then x is tainted)
Operation containing function calls touser defined methods with no parameters.(e.g. if y1 is tainted then x is tainted)
Operation containing function calls touser defined methods with parameters.(e.g. if y1 is tainted then x is tainted)

We researched on common system methods used in Android programming and developed rules to check their influence on taint propagation. Table 3.6 shows sample example
of the rule table
Table 3.6: Abstract of Rule Checking Mechanism
Function Name Any Calling Object Does calling object influence taint propagation Indexes of Parameters that affect taint propagation
toString
Yes
yes
none
append
Yes
yes
any

We take an example to understand the logic of the rule features in column 2,3 &4.Listing 3.5 shows an example of taint tracking through rules.

Listing 3.5: Single Static Assignment Declaration
1
2

3
4
5
6

$r11=virtualinvoke$r10.<android.location.LocationManager:
android.location.Location ...
getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String)>("gps")
$r15=virtualinvoke$r11.<java.lang.StringBuilder:
java.lang.String toString()>();
$r13_1=virtualinvoke$r13.<java.lang.StringBuilder:
java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.Object)>($r15)

To understand the rule features we break Line 1 of the code into different parts of SSA
statement. Listing 3.6 shows code breakdown of assignment operation.

Listing 3.6: Single Static Assignment Declaration
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1
2
3
4
5
6

7

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

\$r11:- destination variable\/object
virtualinvoke:- interface call to object
\$r10:- calling object
android.location.LocationManager:- Calling Object Class
android.location.Location: Calling Object subclass
getLastKnownLocation:- Method\/function on which operation is ...
performed
g. java.lang.String:- return type of the function (9)< () :- ...
contains parameter passed to the function

The first column in rule table 3.6 checks for Android system method in data assignment operation. The second column in the table 3.6 verifies if there are any calling objects.
The third column checks if the calling object affects taint propagation. The fourth column
checks for parameters passed to the Android function. Based on the parameters passed,
the fourth column verifies the influence of the parameters on taint propagation. In (1) $r11
is assigned sensitive value from Android Source function getLastKnownLocation(). As
$r11 now contains sensitive value we mark $r11 as tainted. We apply our rules in column2
and column3 to (2). Column2 checks whether (2) has any calling object. As (2) contains
$r11 as calling object our rule evaluates to true. We then check if $r11 has any influence
in taint propagation. This condition also evaluates to true as $r11 was tainted previously
in (1). Therefore, we now mark $r15 as tainted. In (3), append() function used for data
assignment operation. This append() takes one parameter $r11. The fourth column in rule
table 3.6 checks if any parameters are passed to function influence taint propagation. Let
us assume that $r13 in (3) is not tainted. According to our 2nd rule calling object has no
influence on taint propagation for function append(). However, as the parameter passed
i.e. $r11 is tainted therefore fourth column of rule table evaluates to true. Thus $13 1
is marked tainted. The rule table 3.6 discussed only covers non-sensitive methods in Android programming. The rule table helps speeds up the analysis process instead of creating
environment for functions for analysis.

21

3.7

Parser Design
The goal of the parser is to correctly parse the single static assignment intermediate

represenation of the Android source code. We develop Parser using Python which makes it
easy to parse decompiled Shimple file line by line and interpret results conveniently. The
parser uses the Regex string matching mechanism to parse the line of the source code into
different parts needed for taint analysis. Following are the inputs to the Parser: 1) Shimple
(SSA) file 2) SOURCE functions 3) SINK functions 4) Rule database
SOURCE, SINK, and Rule database act as core input to the parser in tracking information flow from source to sink. The main design challenge of the Parser is to develop taint
analysis intelligence using best possible data structures to improve efficiency and reduce
time complexity. The parser also implements URL tracking. The main challenge for the
URL tracking is the URL obfuscation techniques used by the malware writer. In our parser,
we have use data structure from external libraries such as Networkx[18]to develop information flow intelligence. Following are the advanced features supported by the parser: 1)
Control flow analysis using Graph structure 2) Taint analysis of user defined function calls
using Environment structure 3) Additional taint tracking mechanism for URLs
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Implementation
The parser is the main component of our taint analysis framework. The parser is
developed in Python to parse the Shimple files line by line and provide information flow
analysis of different variables in the source code. The parsers leverage the previous inputs
from source functions, sink functions, rules to track information flow from source functions to sink functions. We now discuss the subcomponents of the parsers used in tracking
information flow in the source code.

4.1

Data Structure
To facilitate information tracking, we need a proper way to track the taint status of the

variables. When a variable takes sensitive information, that variable gets tainted. When information of this tainted variable assigns to another variable, that variable also gets tainted.
Thus in an entire function or method there can be a chain of tainted variables containing various sensitive information. When the static analysis program encounters the sink method,
the program needs to determine whether sink method takes any tainted variable as input.
To assess the status of the input variable, the program needs to check the taint status of the
input and determine the possible information leakage. In our static analysis framework, we
use bidirectional graph structure provided by Networkx a third party python library to store
the status of the taint variables. Networkx offers different functionalities such as finding
successor and predecessor of nodes. Using these features, a graph can be analyzed easily
to determine the root and adjacent nodes. The following illustration shows how networkx
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graph can be used to maintain taint status of the variables.

Listing 4.1: Sample Pseudocode to demonstrate Networkx
1
2
3

var1 = source(); // source is GPS coordinates
var2 = var1;
sink(var2);

In the Listing 4.1 var1 takes value from the source function. In the Pseudocode example, we assume the source is GPS coordinates. The var1 now contains sensitive information, i.e., the var1 is tainted. So we create a root node representing the variable var1 with
attributes status = tainted and data= GPS coordinates. In the second line of the Pseudocode
value of var1 is assigned to var2. The static analysis parser now checks if var1 is present
in the graph and if its status is ’tainted.’ If the parser finds var1 in the graph, the parser
checks if the operation has any taint influence. As the var2 gets data from var1, there is
taint propagation. Therefore the parser now adds a new node to the graph representing var2
as node and attributes as tainted. The parser then creates a bidirectional link between the
var1 node and var2 node. The following figure illustrates the Networkx graph structure.

Figure 4.1: Example Networkx representation
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(Note: If there is no new assignment of sensitive data then the node in the graph has
attribute data=none). In the third line of the pseudocode, the parser encounters sink method
which takes var2 as an input parameter. The parser now consults the graph to check if var2
is present. As variable 2 is present and the status of var2 is tainted, the parser analyzes
the graph by backtracking the var2 node using predecessor functionality provided by the
NetworkX of the var2 node. As the predecessor of the var2 node is var1, the parser extract
the data associated with the var1 node. The parser now knows that the parameter var2 is
tainted and it contains sensitive information (GPS coordinates obtained from var1 node).

4.2

Regex Strings to parse SSA representation
The parser uses the Regex string matching mechanism to parse the given line of the

code. We use an online tool[19] in creating regex strings to aid in our analysis. Following
are the sample regex string implementations for various source code implementation.

4.2.1

Detecting start of the Class Method

Detecting start of the function methods is necessary to update the data structure and its
information. Most of the method names start with access identifiers (either private, public,
static) The Listing 4.2 shows regex string to find access identifiers along with start and end
of input parameters to the method.

Listing 4.2: Finding Function Methods
1
2

re.search("(?:(?:public\\b)|(?:private\\b)|(?:static\\b)|
(?:protected\\b)\s+)(.*)(\\()",line)
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4.2.2

Regex Strings to search function name

Following regex string in Listing 4.3 is used to find function names in the code. The
group 2 give the name of the called method. Using the function name we can verify whether
the function is SOURCE function, a system defined method or a user function.

Listing 4.3: Finding Function Name
1
2
3

search = re.search('(.*)\s(.*)(\\()(.*)(>)', line)
if search:
check_fun1 = search.group(2)

4.2.3

Regex Strings to search $Variable = $Variable assignment operation

The following regex string in Listing 4.2.3 finds simple variable assignment operation.
It helps in the search for the source and destination variable in the information transfer.

1
2
3
4
5

$Variable = $Variable
var_var = re.match('(.*)(\\$)((?:[a-z][a-z0-9_]*))(\\s+)(=)(\\s+)
(\\$)((?:[a-z][a-z0-9_]*))(;)',line)
if var_var:
desvar = "$"+var_var.group(3)

4.2.4

Finding Phi Statement and parsing the parameters in the Phi
statement

Shimple uses ”Phi” Statements to represent control flow of branch instructions. Parsing the parameters to the ”Phi” statement gives an analysis of different variable assignment
as a result of branching operation. Listing 4.4

Listing 4.4: Finding conditional statement
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1
2
3
4
5

loop_assignment = re.search('(.*)(Phi\()(.*)(\)\;)',part2,flags=0)
if loop_assignment:
varstring = loop_assignment.group(3).split(",")
for var in varstring:
var,label = var.split("#")

4.2.5

Finding public static variable name in data assignment operation in the code

A method can access public static variables declared in any part of the code which
makes public static variable as a vulnerable source for sensitive information.Listing 4.5
shows regex string to find public static variables in the assignment operation.

Listing 4.5: Public static variables
1

2
3
4
5

var_psv_assignment = ...
re.match('(\\$)((?:[a-z][a-z0-9_]*))(\\s+)(=)(\\s+)(\\$)
((?:[a-z][a-z0-9_]*))(\\.)(<)(.*?)(:)(\\s+)(.*?)
(\\s+)(.*?)(>)(;)',line)
if var_psv_assignment:
psvt = ...
var_psv_assignment.group(13)+"#"+var_psv_assignment.group(15)

4.2.6

Finding URLs and extracting domain name

Following regex string is a simple example of finding URLs within the source code
and extracting domain name.Listing 4.6 shows regex string to find URLs embedded in the
code.

Listing 4.6: Finding URLs in the code
1
2
3
4

search_url1 = re.search("(?P<url>https?://[ˆ\s]+)", line)
if search_url1:
try:
parsedurl = urlparse(search_url1.group(0))
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domainname = parsedurl.netloc

5

4.2.7

Finding passed parameters and destination variable in a function call

Following regex string finds different parameters passed to the function call and the
destination variable. Applying taint analysis intelligence to parameters can track the influence of parameter in taint propagation. Listing 4.7 shows regex to find passed parameters
to the functions.

Listing 4.7: Finding parameters to the function
1

2
3
4
5
6

var_static_invoke_assignment = ...
re.match('(.*)(\\$)((?:[a-z][a-z0-9_]*)
(\\s+)(=)(\\s+)(staticinvoke)(\\s+)(<)(.*?)(:)(\\s+)(.*?)(\\s+)(.*?)
(\\()(.*?)(\\))(>)(\\()(.*?)(\\))(;)',line)
if var_static_invoke_assignment:
param_passed = var_static_invoke_assignment.group(20)
desvar = "$" + var_static_invoke_assignment.group(3)

4.2.8

Analyzing Source Functions and Information Tracking

Source functions act as a starting point for taint analysis. A malicious programmer
can use these functions to extract sensitive information and store in variables. We term
these variables as tainted variables as they contain sensitive information. When a variable
is first initialized or assigned information from source function we call it as root variable
as it is the starting point for taint analysis. The main design challenge to track and analyze
information flow from these root variable is selecting best data structure to represent tainted
variable. In our parser, we used object of NetworkX library in Python to represent tainted
variable as a node in Graph. Representing a tainted variable as a node in Graph makes it
easy to traverse graph nodes, access information in the nodes and apply special intelligence.
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Determining successors and predecessors of graph nodes (in our case tainted variables)
can help significantly in reducing complexity and increasing speed in taint tracking. We
feed the parser with the source function database which parser can use to track sensitive
functions in data assignment operations. The source function database contains the function
names and the associated data. So, whenever the parser encounters the source function, it
creates a node in graph (we call it as taint graph) with a variable name and data associated
with source function. Following is the implementation of the taint graph to store tainted
variables from source function.

4.3

Taint Propagation
In the first step of taint analysis, we determined root variables containing sensitive

information and created nodes of each variable in the graph. Assignment operations can
propagate taint from one variable to another variable. Therefore, we consider following
test cases for taint propagation.

4.3.1

Simple assignment operation influence

$Variable2 = $Variable 1 where $Variable 1 is root variable(tainted)
The above assignment operation is the simplest form of taint propagation. $Variable
2 gets data from $Variable 1 which makes $Variable2 as tainted. The parser checks for
such operations and adds the node to the Graph. In the above scenario, we add new node
$Variable2to the graph and bi-directional link between $Variable1 and $Variable2. Adding
bi-directional link makes it easy to analyze the graph by determining predecessors and
successor of a node. Determining predecessor of $variable2 we can get all those nodes
which are tainted.
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4.3.2

Class object assignment influence

$Variable 2 = (Class) $Variable 1 where $Variable 1 is object variable of a Class
The above assignment operation is the representation of taint propagation from Class
object variables. We check whether the object (we term all objects as variables containing
some information) of a particular class in the taint graph. If $Variable 1 is in the taint graph,
then we term above operation as taint propagation. Thus, we add $Variable2 in the taint
graph and create a bi-directional link between the two variables. The reverse scenario is
also possible where we assign some variable data to a Class object. [Code]

4.3.3

Public static variable as the tainted source

To access the data of a particular variable declared in different class we use public
static variables. Public static variables thus act as a vulnerable source for taint propagation.
There can be two distinct operations on the public static variables. 1) Assignment of data
to the public static variable
2) Transfer of data via public static variable
In the first case, we check whether there is a propagation of sensitive data to the
public static variables. We can use public static variables in the different class. During
static analysis, we cannot determine what class operation triggers sensitive information to
the public static variables. For example: Class A, Class B, Class C use the public static
variable ”X.” In Class A, X assigns to some non-sensitive information or a variable which
is not in taint graph (e.g. x = $Variable 1). In Class B, X assigns to sensitive information
or a variable which is taint graph (e.g. x = $Variable 2). Class C use variable X to assign
data from X to some other variable (e.g. $Variable 3 = x). An Android App can use
multiple independent activities running simultaneously. So, it is not possible to determine
which Class (A or B) can trigger value of public static variable X in Class C. So, we
consider the worst case where Class B activity triggers taint propagation. Pre-processing
of public static variables is necessary as the parsers check single file at a time. The pre30

processing function checks all occurrences of public static variables in decompiled files and
data assignment operation. We create a new graph for the public static variables with nodes
as public static variables. These nodes have attributes ”taint status” and ”URL” (discussed
in the later sections). During the parsing of Class A, the parser adds variable ”X” to the
public static variable graph and sets taint status as ”None.” When the parser encounters
Class B assignment operation, it checks whether ”X” is in the graph and updates status
only if there is taint propagation. Thus when parser starts checking Class C file operation
”$Variable 3 = x”, the parser knows what the status of variable X (tainted or not tainted) by
looking into the public static variable graph. Depending upon the state of the public static
variable the parser updates the taint graph.

4.3.4

Handling Branch instructions for taint propagation

Branching can induce taint propagation through different instructions executed in different branches. The Shimple (single assignment operation) simplifies the taint analysis
on the branch instruction by representing entire branch instruction into single assignment
operation using ”Phi” statements. Following test case from Soot’s documentation helps us
to analyze how soot handles data transfer operation during the transformation of Android
source code to single static assignment. Listing 4.8 shows an example from soot official
documentation [20] for conditional statements. Listing 4.9 shows Shimple representation
of conditional statmenent.

Listing 4.8: Example from Soot Documenation for Conditional Statements
1
2
3

public int test()
{
int x = 100;

4
5
6
7
8

while(doIt){
if(x < 200)
x = 100;
else
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x = 200;

9

}

10
11

return x;

12
13

}

Listing 4.9: Shimple (SSA) Represenation for conditional statements
1

The shimple output of the above code snippet :

2

i0 = 100;
goto label2;

3
4

(0)

5

label0:
if i0_1

6
7

≥

200 goto label1;

8

i0_2 = 100;
goto label2;

9
10

(1)

11
12
13

(2)

label1:
i0_3 = 200;

14
15
16
17

label2:
i0_1 = Phi(i0 #0, i0_3 #2, i0_2 #1);
if $z0 != 0 goto label0;

18

return i0_1;

19

We first try to analyze the source code. We can infer from the code that return value of
”x” is 100 if the value of ”x” is less than 200 and value of ”x” is 200 if the value of ”x” is
equal or greater than 200. Variable ”x” thus takes two different values during the execution
of the branch instruction. Now we try to analyze the Shimple representation of the source
code for the branch instruction. Listing 4.10 shows phi representation of the conditional
statement.

Listing 4.10: Phi Statement
1

i0_1 = Phi (i0 #0, i0_3 #2, i0_2 #1);
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The Shimple use ”Phi” to track control of flow. The value ”i0 1” gets assigned to
”i0” or ”i0 3” or ”i0 2” depending on the control flow from different control statements
indicated by labels. Thus ”i0 1” gets assigned value 100 or 200. Evaluating the ”Phi”
statement helps us to analyze the possible data transfer from different branch instructions
to the destination variable. For taint analysis, this is critical as different branch instructions
can have an impact on taint propagation. We now consider a simple example in Listing
4.11 to understand taint propagation through various branch instruction.

Listing 4.11: Branch taint influence
1

$Variable 1 = sensitive information

2

$Variable 2 = non-sensitive information

3

if (condition):

4

(0) $Variable 3 = $Variable 1

5

else:

6

(1) $Variable 3 = $Variable 2

The ”Phi” statement for the above code is shown in Listing 4.12

Listing 4.12: Phi Statement for branch instruction
1

$Variable 3 = Phi ($Variable 1 #0, $Variable 2 # 1)

We consider OR Boolean logic for the variables in the ”Phi” statement. If either variable induces taint, then the resultant operation induces taint propagation. Thus, even if
$Variable 2 does not contain sensitive information, $ Variable1 governs taint propagation.
Parser thus add $Variable 3 into the taint graph and add bi-directional link between $Variable 3 and $Variable 1.
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4.3.5

Taint propagation through system defined functions

Non-sensitive methods including Java class methods can also induce taint propagation. For example, a string object can have different operations such as append(), toString()
to add or convert some value of a variable object. We use the rule database to check
system methods which induce taint propagation. Let’s take an example to understand
the taint propagation through system defined methods, e.g., $Variable3 = $Variable1. append($Variable 3)
The above operation attaches values of $Variable 3 to $Variable 1. We know append()
function attach data as it is system defined. So instead of executing the core instructions
of append() function, we can directly infer that append() can influence taint propagation.
Thus using rules for system methods, we can speed up taint analysis operation.

4.3.6

Taint Influence through User Defined Functions

Data assignment operation through user defined function calls can also affect taint
propagation if the return value of the function returns sensitive information. We take following in Listing 4.13 the simple example to illustrate the taint tracking mechanism for
user defined functions.

Listing 4.13: User Defined Function Call
1

$Variable1 = $Variable2.getIMEI();

where \$Variable2 is object ...

of some user defined class and getIMEI() is the class method.

As getIMEI() method is user defined the return value of the method operation is unknown. To evaluate the user defined function calls we leverage the implementation of
environment structure. Whenever the parser encounters user defined function calls, it creates an environment for the called method. The parser then analyzes the instructions in
that function method and determines whether the method returns sensitive value. After the
34

parser examines method entirely, the parser creates a profile of that method and stores it
in memory. The profile determines whether the function returns any tainted variable. So,
next time whenever there is a call to the same function, the parser checks the profile of
the function and determines if there is any taint influence. There are three possible taint
influence cases in function call assignment as shown in Listing 4.14.

Listing 4.14: Single Static Assignment Declaration
1

$Variable1 = $Variable2.getIMEI();

where $Variable2 is tainted

2

$Variable1 = $Variable2.getIMEI(); where $Variable 2 is not tainted

3

$Variable1 = $Variable2.getIMEI($Variable3);

where $Variable 3 ...

is tainted

In the first case (a) $Variable2 is user defined Class object which was previously
tainted. In this case, we do not need to analyze the instructions within the getIMEI() method
as the calling object influence taint propagation. In the second case (b) we require to investigate the code within the getIMEI() method to determine possible taint propagation.
The third case is a particular case where getIMEI() method takes parameters. If getIMEI()
method takes tainted input parameters then it is necessary to analyze the getIMEI() method
as the method can use the input parameter to pass it to other methods or leak the information
through sink functions.

4.4

URL Tracking Taint Mechanism
We added additional taint tracking mechanism for URLs. A malware writer can use

hard coded malicious URLs or IP addresses in the code to send the sensitive information.
The main goal of the URL tracking mechanism is handle as much as possible different ways
an attacker can code to attach sensitive information to the URLs. The major challenge to
this mechanism is the URL obfuscation which is difficult to track using static analysis.
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We now discuss different test cases an attacker can use in the code to attach sensitive
information

4.4.1

Test Case: 1 Appending URL to taint variable through append
function

In the first case we need a data structure which can store variable name and the URL
contained in the variable. We use the same Networkx graph structure we used for taint
tracking to tracking URLs. Whenever Parser detects URL assignment, it creates a new
node in the graph (we term it as link graph data structure in the code) containing the variable
name and URL attached to the variable.Listing 4.15

Listing 4.15: URL through variable
1

$var1 = http://abc.com;

2

$var2 = getSensitiveInfo();

3

$var3 = $var1.append($var2);

After parsing the last instruction code, the link graph contains two nodes $var1 and
$var3 and a bi-directional link between the two variables. Representing variables as nodes
in graph simplifies the analysis and gives a good overview of the connecting nodes and
their relation.

4.4.2

Test Case 2: Variable assignment

Listing 4.16: URL through variable
1

$var1 = http://abc.com;

2

$var2 = $var1

3

$var3 = getSensitiveInfo();
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4

$var4 = $var2.append($var3)

4.4.3

Test Case 3: URL assigned through Public static variables

1

public static String x;

2

x = "http://abc.com"

3

$var2 = getSensitiveInfo();

4

$var3 = x.append($var2);

4.4.4

Test Case 4: URL assigned through user defined function

The compose URL function is the user defined function which prepares malicious
URL and returns URL to the called function.

1

$var1 = composeURL();

2

$var2 = getSensitiveInfo();

3

$var3 = $var1.append($var2)

4.4.5

Test Case 5: Passing URL and taint variable to a Class method

The send data function takes two parameters: URL (or a variable containing URL)
and the tainted variable. The method then uses both parameters to form JSON object to
send it to the control server.

1

$var1 = "http://abc.com"

2

$var2 = getSensitiveInfo();

3

sendData($var1,$var2);
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4.4.6

Test Case 6: Monitoring return values of the funiton methods

The return value can contain the URL composed by the function. So URL tracking
mechanism also has to track the return value from the function. Function can either return
URL directly or though the variable.

1

$var1 = "http://abc.com"

2

return $var1;

3
4

OR

5
6

return "http://abc.com";

4.4.7

Test Case 7: Monitoring parametes in the Phi Statement

Conditional statements can also assign URLs to the variables. Monitoring the parameters to the Phi statements can help to track such operations. It is possible that attacker
can send the same information to different URLs depending upon the condition (status of
information harvesting server)

1

if (condition)

2

(0) $var1 = "http://xyz.com"

3

else

4

(1) $var2 = "http://abac.com"

5
6

$var3 = Phi($var1 #0, $var2 #1)

7

$var4 = getSensitiveInfo();

8

sendData($var3, $var3)
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Evaluation
In the previous sections, we discussed the static taint analysis parser to track the sensitive information flow. To determine the sensitive information targetted by the malware
binaries and the sinks used in information leakage, we use the static taint analysis framework on a large dataset of the malicious Android binaries. In the first part of the Evaluation
results, we discuss different sources and sinks used in information leakage by the malware
families. The second part of the evaluation section discusses malicious domains, IPs, and
various methods used by the attacker to exfiltrate data from the Android phone with the help
of malicious binaries to the attacker-controlled URLs. In the final section of evaluation results, we try to derive essential relationships between the leaked data, malware family and
the malicious URLs. The thesis work was evaluated using the malware samples provided
by the Trustlook Company and some experimental Apps which leak sensitive information.
The output of the program was compared with the network traffic generated by the samples
to assess the accuracy of the experimental results. We now discuss the results generated by
the framework.

5.1

Sensitive Sources Identified
After running our framework over large data set of malicious Android samples, we

found 26 unique, sensitive sources in information leakage. The Table 5.1 gives a list of
sensitive source identified in information leakage.
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Table 5.1: Sensitive Information Identified
DeviceName
Packagename
DeviceId
SimcardSubscriberInfo
Celltowerinformation
Databasetableinformation
MAC Address
Key
Sim1 number
Network Information
SW Version Info
Simcardprovider

Wi-Fi ConnectionInformation
FilePath
Simcardserialnumber
Runningtask
GPSaltitude
WifiBSSIDInformation
PortNumber
Devicespeed
IPaddress
GPSlatitude
GPSlongitude
Wi-Fi SSID Info

Following is the sensitive information carrried by each SOURCE:
1) DeviceName: Device Name provided Android device user’s name from configuration
settings
2) WifiConnectionInformation: Wifi connection information about wireless configuration,
strength and other details
3) Packagename: Information about the installed application package
4) FilePath: Information about the file location information
5) DeviceId: IMEI number of the phone. IMEI number is unique number to each device
6) Simcardserialnumber: IMSI number information
7) SimcardSubscriberInfo: Other sensitive details of the sim card
8) Running task: List of running tasks or applications on the phone
9) Cell tower information: GSM network information such as MCC, MNC, and LAC
10) GPS altitude: GPS location information
11) Databasetableinformation: Information stored in local SQL database. App can use local database to store and retrieve information.
12) WifiBSSIDInformation: Wireless BSSID information
13) MACaddress: Hardware address. MAC address is unique to the hardware
14) PortNumber: Port Number used by the application. Apps may use different port num-
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bers to communicate with the outside world
15) Device speed: Android device speed details
16) Sim1number: Line1 number used by the Android user
17) GPS Latitude: GPS Latitude coordinates. GPS information can be used to track user’s
location on the Maps
18) GPS Longitude: GPS Longiutde coordinated. GPS information can be used to track
user’s location on the Maps
19) WifiSSIDInformaiton: Wireless Network Name
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5.2

SINKS Identified
The static taint analysis of the malware samples identified sinks shown in Table 5.2 in

the information leakage.
Table 5.2: Sink Functions Identified
org.json.JSONObject
android.util.Log
android.telephony.SmsManager
com.android.netutil.utils.HTTPUploader
Following is the description of the Sinks and the ways an attacker can use these sink
for information leakage.

5.2.1

org.json.JsonObject

This sink has the largest detection rate in information leakage. or.json.JSON object
is widely used by Apps to send to command and control server. Many Apps use HTPP
connection class to set up the connection between client and server. Json object and URL
are used as an input parameter to the HTTP connection.

5.2.2

android.util.log

Many app developers use Logs to dump runtime information. This error information
then can be fetched to detect error and bugs. Due to poor coding practice, some apps
can dump sensitive information via logs. This makes Logs a potential Sink as well as the
SOURCE for the sensitive information.
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5.2.3

android.telephony.SmsManager

The API can be used by Apps to send text messages over GSM. The same API can
be used by malicious applications to send information to the attacker. Many SMS banking
trojans use this API to leak sensitive information of the user.

5.2.4

com.android.netutils.HTTPUploader

This API can also be used to send data via URLs.
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5.3

Suspicious Domains
To transfer data from App to the server, many Apps use hardcoded URLs in the source

code. These URLs can be either domains or IPs of the control server. After analyzing the
malware samples using static taint analysis, we found suspicious domains which accounted
for 82 percent of overall suspicious URLs observed. The taint analysis helped us to analyze
what information is attached to these domain names. In section V we discuss the sensitive
data attached to these domains, section VI discusses the geographic location of the domain
registration and section VIII discuss the relation of malware samples with the suspicious
domains.Table 5.3 shows the identified Suspicious URLs.
Table 5.3: Suspicious URLs
www.toptools100.com
ws.sd4face.com
interface.kokmobi.com
interface.madpush.com
m.360dream.net
s.iyd.cn

5.4

service.sm-adoss.com
adm.kemoge.net
app.wapx.cn
api.blueskysz.com
mmsc.monternet.com
log.appsolo.net

Suspicious Ips
We also found hardcoded IP addresses in the information leakage. Out of the suspi-

cious URLs analyzed, we found 11 percent suspicious IPs involved in information leakage.
We also found local IP address which can also become a potential threat if other malicious
apps use the local IP address to receive sensitive information. Unlike domains which can
have multiple IP addresses or dynamic IP address, the hardcoded IP addresses in the malicious code are static IP addresses. Some IP address also has port numbers in the hardcoded
URLs which we discuss in next section. It is important to note that the IPs can also be
registered cloud services used by an attacker to gather sensitive information. In Section IV,
we discuss the Cloud IPs observed in the URLs.
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5.5

Suspicious Port Numbers
We found specific port numbers in the hard-coded URLs. The port number accounts to

both suspicious domains and IPs. Unlike many domains which use default port 80 or well
know port numbers to communicate we found port numbers which are defined outside wellknown port numbers. The attacker can run any malicious service on these port numbers to
gather sensitive information of the target. The Table 5.4 shows suspicious port numbers
and their percentage count. Note the observed port numbers are TCP port numbers as our
study is based on malware which use HTPP method to send information. It is important
to note that some port numbers such as 8080 or 8088 can also be HTTP proxies. As an
attacker can run malicious service to any port numbers, any specific port number does not
count to any particular service. But, using the observed port numbers, we can filter our
suspicious ones to reduce the attack surface and mitigate the risk.
Table 5.4: Suspicious Port Numbers
8088
8081
8888
9898
8000
8003
8079
4300
10003
9092

8094
8091
8090
7004
18080
18081
9081
8061
9004
8004
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8023
8125
8007
8001
8002
8084
5222
8181
9884
7428

5.6

Using Cloud to collect sensitive data
Some cloud services offer free service to host personal web services. An attacker can

use the free service to run multiple malicious web services to harvest information from the
infected Android users. The additional benefit cloud can offer to the attacker is that most
traditional firewall or ex-filtration systems only block malicious websites and allow legitimate domains including cloud services. From the URLs collected, we found 11 percent
URLs as IP addresses. On further analysis of IP addresses, we found 60 percent of IPs
registered to cloud computing services. Table 5.5 shows ISP registration of the IPs.
Table 5.5: Sample Cloud IPs observed and corresponding ISP
106.75.199.154
114.113.225.163
113.31.81.147
115.236.18.198
115.28.222.200
117.121.21.92
119.29.19.163
120.26.106.206
121.40.89.73
121.42.14.182

5.7

Shanghai UCloud Information Technology Company Lim
International Pioneering Park
BeiJing QianJingShiJi Co.
China Telecom Zhejiang
Aliyun Computing Co.
CNLink Network Technology
Tencent cloud computing
Aliyun Computing Co.
Aliyun Computing Co.
Aliyun Computing Co.

Top Domain Registrants for suspicious URLs
The Table 5.6 shows top domain registrants of the suspicious URLs.
Table 5.6: Domain Registration
Domain Registrant
IRT-CNNIC-CN
IRT-CHINANETCN
Amazon Technologies Inc

Number of suspicious domain registered
58
56
17
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5.8

URL registration and Geographic location
We also studied the geographic locations of the suspicious URLs involved in infor-

mation leakage. The table shows a breakdown of different geographic location codes and
number of sensitive information sent to these areas. Although an attacker can register to
any malicious service in the world, the geographic location information is necessary to derive intelligence on network traffic and block traffic if it matches a particular pattern. Table
5.7 and Table 5.8 shows which information leaked to different countries.
Table 5.7: Number of different sensitive source leaked to different geographic locations of
URLs
Country Code
CN
US
SG
HK
VG
CZ
IE
CA
IN
AU

No. of Sensitive Source Attached
24
19
14
7
3
3
2
2
2
1

Table 5.8: Data Leaked to different Countries
China

United States

Singapore

Simcardprovider
Celltowerinformation
Databasecolumninformation
Databasetableinformation
DeviceId
DeviceName
FilePath
GPSaltitude
GPSlongitude
IPaddress
Key
MACaddress
NetworkInformation
Networkoperatorname
Packagename
PortNumber
Sim1number
Simcardserialnumber
SimcardSubscriberInfo
VersionInfo
WifiBSSIDInformation
WifiConnectionInformation
WifiSSIDInformation

Simcardprovider
Celltowerinformation
Databasetableinformation
DeviceId
DeviceName
GPSaltitude
GPSlatitude
GPSlongitude
Key
MACaddress
NetworkInformation
Networkoperatorname
Packagename
Runningtask
Sim1number
Simcardserialnumber
SimcardSubscriberInfo
VersionInfo
WifiSSIDInformation

Runningtask
Celltowerinformation
DeviceId
DeviceName
Key
MACaddress
Networkoperatorname
Packagename
Simcardprovider
SimcardSubscriberInfo
VersionInfo
WifiConnectionInformation
WifiSSIDInformation
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5.9

Sensitive Data Attached to the URLs
In previous sections, we observed URLs involved in the information leakage. This

section, discusses the sensitive information sent over these URLs. The study helps us to
analyze more details of the source of the information and destination of information in the
information leakage. In this paper, we mostly focused on the malicious URLs in the information leakage, but we also found other sinks in the malware samples. In the latter part,
we discuss these sink to understand more details of the potential threat. The table shows a
list of sensitive source targeted by the malware samples and percentage of suspicious URLs
carrying these sensitive sources. The Table 5.9 shows sensitive information source targeted
by the suspicious URLs. We can use the table information to determine the most popular
and potential sensitive source. Note the table shows only the count for URLs involved in
the information leakage. The number varies depending upon the features or category of the
malicious samples. Studying these number, we can determine what sensitive information
attacker is interested. Device Name and Package Name which accounts to large count gives
specifics of the Android user and the malware details. The Simcard information provides
GSM related information such as MCC, MNC and LAC information. DeviceId provides
IMEI number of the infected phone which is unique to a particular device. Database table
information is the information stored by the Apps in the local SQLite database. We use the
local database as sensitive source as it can contain any sensitive information which apps
can store. Note accessing SQL lite database of other Apps require special read permission.
We assume the malicious samples have all required permissions to access sensitive sources.
GPS longitude, altitude, latitude provides device coordinates for locating the device on the
map. There are a lot of information security threat concerns with the sensitive sources
which we discuss in section X of the paper.
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Table 5.9: Percentage of suspicious domains leaking sensitive information

Data Leaked
DeviceName
Packagename
DeviceId
SimcardSubscriberInfo
Celltowerinformation
Databasetableinformation
MACaddress
Key
Sim1number
NetworkInformation
VersionInfo
Simcardprovider
Networkoperatorname
GPSlatitude
GPSlongitude
WifiSSIDInformation
WifiConnectionInformation
FilePath
Simcardserialnumber
Runningtask
GPSaltitude
WifiBSSIDInformation
PortNumber
Devicespeed
IPaddress
Databasecolumninformation

5.10

% Leaked
65.68
47.92
29.88
21.00
16.86
13.90
11.24
10.65
8.28
5.32
4.73
3.55
2.95
2.95
2.66
2.07
1.77
1.77
1.47
1.18
1.18
0.88
0.88
0.59
0.29
0.29

Malware Name and Sensitive Information

We also studied the malware sample categories used in information leakage. We used
Virus Total[21]to extract specifics of malware samples such as malware family name. We
then tried to relate specific sensitive source attacked by each malware family. The Table
5.10 shows the malware family name and number of sensitive source attacked by the malware family. The number of sensitive sources is the sum of all unique, sensitive source
observed in malware samples belonging to a malware family. Note the count is not just
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specific to URLs but also contains samples which leak information to other sinks. Relating
number of sensitive information targeted by each malware families can help us to interpret
malicious nature of samples in information leakage. Table 5.11 shows suspicious URLs
connected by different number of malware families. We use this information in the section
IX where we discuss the relation between malware family and suspicious URLs involved
in information leakage.
Table 5.10: Malware Family and Type of Sensitive Information
Malware Name
Android/Deng.VSD
Android/Deng2.BS
Android/AdWo
Android/G2P.MJ.615155967189
Android ctl2.DOP
Android/Deng.GLW
Android dc.ARTK
Android/G2P.BR.18C97926AF2F
Android/Deng.UPJ
Android/Deng.WEG
Android/Deng.GKW
Android/Fakengr
Android:Agent-KTX [PUP]
Android/G2P.BO.405F386BD6B4
Android ctl2.SPC
Android/G3M.AB.38027EF69C4C
Android/Deng.LYF
Android/G2P.DD.AFBBC1192E24
Android/Deng.GMZ

5.11

#Sensitive Info
21
20
19
19
19
19
19
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
16
16
16
15

Malicious Binary Type

Malware samples which leak information to suspicious URLs can have different sink
count. We studied what percentage of malware samples leak a particular number of sensitive information to the URLs. The Table 5.12 shows binary type and percentage of samples
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Table 5.11: My caption
suspicious URLs
oc.umeng.com
adm.kemoge.net
interface.kokmobi.com
www.toptools100.com
feedback.whalecloud.com
sdks.zy333.cn
se.nisemono.info
sdkj.zy333.cn
m.irs01.com
sdkm.w.inmobi.com
www.myapp.com
dock.inmobi.com
ad.flurry.com
alogus.umeng.com
alog.umeng.com
i.w.inmobi.com
ad.adspoo.com
app.wapx.cn
mmsc.myuni.com.cn
data.flurry.com

Malware Family Count
27
12
12
11
11
9
9
9
9
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6

of that binary type. We found 12 percent of samples of the total samples which leak information to the suspicious URLs leak only one kind of information. We also calculated the
percentage of samples which leak different kinds of information. The Table 5.12 helps us
derive intelligence from samples leaking sensitive information.

5.12

Malware samples and suspicious URLs

A malware sample can connect to n number of URLs to leak information. Some
samples have large count than others which make them more suspicious in information
harvesting. It is possible that malware samples can connect to benign domains through
inbuilt or 3rd party libraries. In this paper, we only consider the suspicious URLs the
malware connects to leak information. The Table 5.13 shows the malware family names
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Table 5.12: Malicious Binaries Type and Sensitive Information Count
Binary Type # of sensitive info
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

% Count
12.42
7.69
7.1
9.46
4.73
9.46
2.95
5.32
5.91
4.14
2.36
8.28
2.95
2.95
2.95
1.77
2.36
2.36
2.95
0.59
0.59

and number of suspicious URLs connected by the malware family. The reverse is also
possible where multiple malware samples use same suspicious URLs to send information.
The analysis gives the malicious nature of both malware family and suspicious URLs in
the information leakage.
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Table 5.13: My caption
Malware Family
Android/Deng.UPJ
Android/G2P.BR.18C97926AF2F
Android/G2P.MJ.615155967189
Android/Deng2.BS
Android/Deng.VSD
Android/Deng.TC
Android/Fakengr
Android/Deng.ME
Android/AdWo
Android/Deng.WEG
Android/Mseg

5.13

No.Of Suspicious URLs
23
21
19
19
16
14
13
13
13
11
10

Information Security Threat

Table III shows what type of information Android malware leaks to URLs. Studying
the particular of the information is necessary as an Attacker can use information in different
attacking scenarios. Device Name and Package Name at first seems legitimate for an App to
send to the server. Android banking Trojan[22] is one of the Android malware family who
use package name to identify the Package information installed on the infected Android
user. The malware uses the Package name to detect compatibility and sends a fake login page to the infected device to steal other credentials. Cell tower information also acts
as a sensitive source when it comes to spying or setting device configuration to undertake
other attacks. TrojanSMS.Boxer[23] is one of the Android malware family who steals
information related to Cell Tower such as MCC and MNC to retrieve configuration settings
from command and control server to send messages to premium numbers and earn money.
An attacker can extract file path information from the infected phone to retrieve the list
of files under a particular directory. The file path information acts as a sensitive source
where a user store files containing sensitive information to his device. An attacker can also
use running task information[24] from the infected phone to check the running status of a
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particular App on the infected phone. If the particular App is running, the malicious binary
can download fake login page from command and control server and display an overlying
window on the top of the App to trick victims into disclosing sensitive information.

5.14

Malware samples and information leaked

The previous sections all discussed measurements related to suspicious URLs as a
sink in information leakage. There are different ways malware can leak information to
the outside world other than URLs. Some of the other sinks could be through Android
logs, messaging or broadcasting information through Android intent. After analyzing the
samples through static taint analysis, we found x percent of samples use putExtra() a sink
function used to broadcast intent information, y percent of samples used messaging to leak
information, z percent of samples to dump sensitive information to the logs. Information
security threat from these sinks is discussed in the later sections. The Table 5.14 shows the
percentage of samples which leak different sensitive information. If we compare the table
x with table y, we can observe the results are almost similar. The table more focuses on the
sensitive source targeted by the malware rather than leaked to the suspicious URLs.

5.15

Using Logs to steal sensitive information

Another interesting case we studied while analyzing malware samples is 45.81 percentage of malware sample leak information to the logs. Many developers use Android.Util.Log
API to log errors occurring in the execution. These errors can contain sensitive information
related to the device. An App having read permission to logs can read sensitive information
from the logs using the logcat command. The question we can ask is why malware samples
would leak information to logs? Is it just poor programming practice or using logs as the
Sensitive source for another malware.
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Table 5.14: Malware Samples and Sensitive Information
Sensitive Data
Device Name
Database table information
Package name
DeviceId
Sim card Subscriber Info
MAC address
Sim1 number
Key
Cell tower information
GPS latitude
Version Info
Network Information
Wifi SSID Information
GPS longitude
Network operator name
Wifi BSSID Information
Sim card serial number
Wifi Connection Information
GPS altitude
Port Number
IP address
Running task
Device speed

5.16

%samples
60.87
60.87
51.67
27.09
20.74
8.19
7.19
6.18
6.02
3.85
3.18
2.68
2.01
2.01
1.67
1.67
1.00
0.84
0.50
0.50
0.33
0.17
0.17

Using Messaging to steal sensitive information

We also studied samples which leak information through Android.Telephony.SMSManager
API. We found 4.71 percent of malware samples use Android.Telephony.SMSManager API
as a sink in their information leakage. Existing network filtering mechanisms can stop malware leaking information through the internet but how do we stop malware samples leaking
information through SMS raises a new information security concern.
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5.17

Information Leakage Interesting Case

Ever wondered a camera picture could also leak sensitive information? We conducted
a series of experiments where a malware inserts sensitive information into the metadata of
the image. Many modern day camera applications embed GPS coordinates into the picture
as a Geo tagging feature. Adding GPS coordinates to the image involves operation on the
metadata of the picture. Metadata of the picture thus act as a potential sink where malware
can add any sensitive information to the picture. We developed a malware sample which
takes a picture and inserts IMEI and Contact number into the Exif data of the captured
photo. Figure 5.1 shows how sensitive information can be embedded into the picture using EXIF attributes. Figure 5.2 shows the sensitive information IMEI number and Line1
number in the Author and Copyright section.

Figure 5.1: Setting EXIF attributes in malware sample
The experiment clearly shows that an image can also act as a potential sink in the
information leakage.Although we did not find any traces in the malware samples provided,
it remains a potential threat. The above screenshot shows the property details of the picture taken from our customized camera app. We can see from the picture that sensitive
information IMEI number and Sim1 number attached to the image. We upload images to
many social networking websites or store it in public cloud storage. Although some social
networking sites remove EXIF data before they upload the picture to their servers, some
sites retain the metadata information. This becomes a potential source for the attacker to
extract sensitive information from the phone. Many exfiltration systems also fail in check-
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Figure 5.2: Image Capture Metadata Details showing IMEI and Line1 Number
ing the image as it appears to be legitimate. The taint analysis system we developed can
successfully check such leaks by performing static analysis from source of the picture to
the destination of the sink (here the EXIF data)
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Discussion
The taint analysis system we developed shows an effective way of tracking information leakage in the Android binaries. Designing of the system was challenging, starting
from selecting best intermediate representation for taint analysis and tracking the last data
flow to the sink. The system we developed can be used on benign apps to detect information leakage vulnerabilities. A large number of developers do not follow secure coding
practice guideline which leads to vulnerabilities in the application. According to CERT
rules[25] for Android secure coding practice,dumping sensitive information to the logs can
be detrimental. We conducted few experiments and found many applications do not comply with secure coding practice guideline. Many challenges that are not addressed in the
static taint analysis such as URL obfuscation can be addressed in the dynamic analysis.
The current taint system is only applicable for Android applications, but the methodology
remains same for other smart-phone platforms also.
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Conclusion
The thesis has discussed the static taint analysis to detect information leakage in Android binaries. We also presented several challenges in taint analysis and the ways malware
can send information over different sinks. The thesis also addresses several problems in analyzing relations between the leaked data and the URLs. Unlike the prior approaches which
only focus on specifics on information leakage or the suspicious domains contacted, we go
further in analyzing the association of leaked data to several suspicious URLs and other
sinks. We also discussed some interesting cases of how malware can leak information
through different mediums such as pictures. With the help of Single Static Assignment
representation in static analysis, we also demonstrated a simple taint analysis approach
for Android applications. Implementing environment analysis in taint analysis is costly
regarding time complexity, but it reduces the overall false positive rate. Although the research focuses on the malware binaries, the taint analysis framework can be used to detect
information leakage vulnerabilities in the benign application.
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